








Link to publication in Tilburg University Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Bester, H. (1993). Price commitment in search markets. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1993-9). CentER.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners
and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
            • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
            • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
            • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately
and investigate your claim.








IIIIIIII~~Ih III I~N n~l~l~~~
No. 9309
Price Commitment in Search Markets
by Helmut Bester
January 1993




'fhis paper studies the (ormation of pricing rules in search markets. At a
cost, eacb seller can commit himself to a fixed price. If he takes no actions to
preclude haggling, his sales price is determined through bilateral negotiations with
the buyer. The selection o( pricing rules exhibits strategic complementarities that
may give rise to multiple equilibria. Differences in trading practices across countries
and cultures may thus be consistent with equilibrium behavior. In bazaar markets,
whcre tho buycr's cost of switching sellers is relatively low, most o( the trade is
condurlod cia bargaining and prices are close to the perfectly competitive outcome.
Iu,S'worvls: ISargaining, Commitment, Search 'I'hcory, Pricing Rules;
.ll?L ('I:~.sifiratiun No.: ('ïR, D40. 1)R3




I'hi. I,atK~r .InJir. Ihr f„nn:tt.iun of pricinR rulev in sFarrh market.s. f;arl,y work on
sc,arch, inspin~~l by Stigler (19ti1), (ocused on the question of how a consumer oughL
lu .carrh upliiually whon arqniring pricc informatiou is costly. I~ollowiug liothschild's
ll!lïa) criticistn Lhal. Lhesc~ mudc~ls fail tu cxplain thc origiu of prices, thc scarch mar-
ket literatnre has invcstigated two different principles of price determination. The first
catcgory o( models asswnes that each seller posts a fixed price. The buyer then decides
whether to accept this offer or to continue his search. Making a take-it-or-leave-it offer
allows the se~ller to capture all the gains from trade. The most important implication of
Lhis assumption is the famous `monopoly price paradox' of Diamond (1971): As long as
all buycrs havc search costs bounded away from zero, each seller will optimally charge
the monopoly price. The eyuilibrium outcome is thus independent of the level of search
costs. Thc second approach avoids this rather extreme prediction by studying bilateral
negotiations as an alternative pricing rule. The seller and the buyer bargain about the
pricc and sharo thc gains from trade. The buyer's bargaining position depends on his
ability to find an alternativc seller and, therefore, his share of the surplus is negatively
rclat.ed lo the~ cost of se~arch. 't'he impact of this cost on the bargaining equilibrium has
ba~n studic~d in thc standarcl scarch model by [3ester (1988) and in markets with bilateral
search by Diamond and Maskin (1979) and Rubinstein and Wolinsky (1985).
Sincc thc two approaches have rather different implications regarding the relation be-
t.wcen scarch cost.s and e~quilibrium prices, they raise the question of which pricing mech-
:niisnt niurr :,t,t,rul,ri:,LrIY ~h~.cril,c~s a F;ivon ~c~:uch ouviruu~nrul.. 'I'hix pap~-t' a,hlrc.aYC~w
Lhi, pruhlciu by invc.~Ligat.in}; a nwdcl in which thc markeL participant.s cndogcnously
solrct trading rnlos. In part.icular, we study how t.he process of price formation is affected
Ly I hc Ic~vc~l of scarch costs.
Posting a take-it-or-leave-it price is not credible unless the seller has the ability to
curnrnit hintsclf to his offcr. In t.he absence of cornmitment, if the buyer rejects the offer,
iL is not in thc scller's intFrest to refuse to bargain. Following Schelling's (1956) analysis
of t.hc conunit.mcnt. aspects of bargaining, commitme,nt can be~ achieved by taking actions
that mako it impossible to back down írom one's demand. Typically such actions are
ro~tlc and .u an individual will commit himself only if the benefita outweigh the cost of
conunitmcnt.' ('ontracting with an outside party is a simple device that the seller can
use to prcveut bargaining. One possible strategy is to hire an intermediary or sales clerk,
who is iustructed to sell the good at a fixed price. The posted price offer then becomes
cmdiblc bccausc this agent is not authorized to negotiate price reductions.
It turus out that each individual seller's net benefit from committing to a fixed price
depends on the commitment decisions of all the other sellers. This means that the selec-
tion of priciug rulcs constitutes a game between the sellers. This game exhibits strategic
complemcntarity since each seller's incentive to prevent bargaining increases with the
fraction of scllors who commit themsclves not to haggle? At least for some parameter
constcllat.iuns, tliis tiupcnnoclular structurc gcncratcs mult.iple cquilibria. These equi-
libri:r dilfcr in t.hc, pricing rulc that. is adopted by the rnajority of Lraders. In reality
Lradiug practim. uftcu di(fcr across countries and cultures. '1'he possibility of multiple
cyuilibriunt uutcumcs i. consistcnt with this observation. Whcu ratioual bchavior shows
no tenclcncy t.o climinatc one or the other pricing institution over time, historical and
cultural factors rnay bccome important for the evolution of pricing institutions.3
'I'he analysis of markets with small search costs leads to some surprising results. In
snch nrarkct.s Lhcrc always is an equilibrium in which only a minority of sellers charges
n lixccl pric~, :cnJ tnua of thc Lradc i, couductrd via bargaining. 'fhal. ix, bargaining
constitutes a viable pricing rule when the buyer's cost oí switching sellers is relatively
low. In rcalily thc~ lattcr coudition is probably sat.isfied in bazaar markets, where many
stores oflcring close substitutes are located near one another. Our analysis shows that
in tnarkcts with Ihcsc fcatures thc sellers have little to gain from committing to a fixed
price. Anothcr implication is that equilibrium prices are close to the perfectly compet-
il.ivc outcomc whcn search costs are small. The endogenous determination of trading
rulcs thus csrapcs thc 'mouopoly price paradox'.
3
I'hc t wu t rading rules dificr in the timing ofprice determination. In the posted pricing
regirne prices arP fixed bejor~e the buyer enters a store. Negotiated pricing determines
a price aJfcr the buyer has selected a seller. The relation between ex ante and ex post
pricing is also studied in Gale (1988), Peters (1991), and Bester (1993). In these models
ox ante pricing means that the buyer becomea informed about prices before he visits a
sollcr. 'I'his is not thc casc here. As in the usual search model, the buyer forms ratio-
nal expcct.at.ions about the distribution of prices; but he has to pay a cost to find out
t.ho pricc' at a particular storc. '1'he commitment incentives of a monopolistic seller are
iuwwtigatcd in Rilcy and 'l,cckhauser (1983) and Fudenberg, Levine, and Tirole (1987).
'I'hesc' aut.hurs cuusidcr a monopolist who searches for a customer. In our model the
con,untcrs c~nt;:t~;r~ in ze'arcó aud strategic interactions betwecn the sellers are the driving
forcc' lichincl onr resnlts.
Section '? of the paper introduces a simple search environment. Section 3 describes
tho two principlc~s of pricing behavior. The equilibrium determination of pricing rules
is studied in Section 4. Section 5 investigates some equilibrium properties and the
role of scarch costs. Finally, Section 6 concludes by discussing limitations and possible
cxt.ensious o( thP tnodel.
2 The Model
('un,irlcr Lhc sitnplcst scarrh ntoclcl wil.h idcnt,ical bnycn of a. singlc hornogencous good.
'I'hon' i. a cuntinnutn uf sr'llr't:. mpmaoutcd Ly the' iutcrval ](1, 1]. 'I'bcY Produce the gcwd
ll r~ullvl:Ull. rr'1.111'llv tu ~c:~lr~ anrl LIn'ir r'unllnutl Ittltl. p1'urlqt'Liull r'uvl. is r' ,~~ (1. I'.:u'll uf l,hr'
consuntors wishes to purchase at most a single unit of the commodity. His reservation
pricc is r 1 r. 'I'Ite consumers do not interact strategically with each other. This together
with thc assutnption of constant returns to scale implies that the equilibrium outcome
is indcpc'ndcut of t.hc total mass of consumers.
A seller cannot communicate with the buyer before he enters the store. From the
huyer's ~ icwpuint all sellers look alike and so he selects one of them at random. If he is
not. xatiaiccl with t.hc pricc at this storc, he may walk out and scarch again. Scarch is
costly; the buyer has to pay s~ 0 when he switches sellers. We assume that visiting the
lirst scllor is cosl.loss. 'I'his assumption is usually made in the search literature to avoid
oquilibriunc outromos whcrc thc buycr refuses to cnter the tnarkct. In Lhc ab:cencc oi
seller or buyer heterogeneity, the standard search model predicts no repeated search. The
buyer always purchascs the good at the first store he visits. Nonetheless, the expected
payo(f from soarching again is important to determine the buyer's `outside option' and
the price hc actually has to pay. I,et p~ denote the price the buyer expects to pay
in cquilibrium. rlft.cr yuit.Ling a store, the buyer can either leave the market or go to
auol.her scllcr. LeL a~ bc t he expected value of the searcher's profit if he follows an optimal
stratcgy. 'I'hon
v- max[0, r- p~ - s]. (1)
In what. follows, we study equilibria where the consumers' price expectation is con-
sistent with t.hc actual process of price determination.
3 Pricing Institutions
Ilow arc priccs dctcrmincd in search markets'? In this section we will brie(Iy explore two
clilfomnl. pricin}; inst.itul.ions. In t.hc following sect.ion the detormination of the pricing
rulc will bc cn~logc,nizod. A largc part of scarch thcxiry asswucs thxt thc scllcr couunita
to a pricc bcJnrr Lhc buycr has ent.crcd t.hc storc. F,ffectively, the scller then makes a
takc-it-or-Icavc-it pricc o(fcr. Let p,- dcnote the commitment price. If the buyer is not
willing Lo pay t.his pricc, hc yuits and gets thc payoff v. 'I'herefore, he will certainly
acccpt any price p; such that r- p~ ~ v. As long as this inequality holds, the seller could
increase p~ slightly to increase profits. In eyuilibrium, the seller will quote a price such




Gquations (1 ) and ('l) together with the rational expectations assumption p~ - p~
r)ctermine thc search market equilibrium when all the sellers commit themselves to a
price. It follows immediately that the equilibrium is unique with
P~-r. (3)
I'ricc courmitnrrnL in combination with costly search allows the sellers to charge the
consunicr's rescrvation valuation. This outcome is well-known as the Diamond (1971)
`mouolwly pricc paradox': Even in a market with many sellers the equilibrium price is
t.he monopoly price, independently of the level of search costs.
Whcu thc~ sc,llcr has not committed himself, the price is determined through bilateral
ncgotiatious ujlrr thc buycr has arrivcd at the store. The sellcr bargaius separately with
oarh pru.fH,rf ivc~ r~onswnr~r. 'I'o,t.udy thc out.comc of Lhis alt.ernative pricing institution,
K'1` N'III asscunr Lhat thr Lwu partics shxrc thc bargaining surplus cyually accordiug to
lhc,ynrnrot.ric~ Nash bargaiuing solution. '1'his solntion can bc justified by Nash's (1950)
axiorns; morc recently 13inmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) have suggested a non-
ccxilrerative intcrpretation based on the strategic alternating offers model of Rubinstein
(192i2). If thc Inryer yuits, he gets n while the seller gets nothing. This determines the
'stalus-quo' point. of thc bargaining problem. The net surplus from reaching an agree-
ment equals r- c- v. Let pb denote the outcome of the price negotiation. Since the
buyer gcts ouo ha.lf of the available surplus in addítion to his outside option payoff, py
has to satisfy
r-p6-0.5(r-c-v)tv. (9)
Whc~u .c~llcr~ .cncl buycrs bargain about. prire, this equation together with (1) and
p,. -. pb dc~linr~s I ho nrarkrt cqnilihrium. 'I'ho zolut.ion yiclds
6
pb - min[0.5(r ~ c), c-F s). (5)
The equilibrium price now depends on the level of search costs. If s~ 0.5(r - c), the
buyer finds himself in a situation of bilateral monopoly with the seller because switch-
ing is rather costly. In this case the buyer's option of quitting plays no role so that
pb - 0.5(r f c). If s c 0.5(r - c), the threat to quit enables the buyer to induce a lower
price. ln fact, when the search cost becomes negligible as s-. 0, the equilibrium price
at,t~r~rarhr. thi, r„inpetilivi~ prirr imdi,r pcrfect. infonnat.ion. Az in Rester (19RR), thc
bargxiuiug appruacli has thc attractivc feature thaL the market equilibria under imper-
fccl and prrf~,ct iuformat.iun are very siniilar whcn search costs are small.
Obviuusly, jr,. 1 jrb. '1'he scllers earn higher profits in the scenario where they commit
the~nselves not to haggle. Notice that p~ is independent of s and that ps decreases with
s. If commitrnent can be obtained at some cost, this observation might lead to the con-
jecture that t.he profit from committing to a fixed price is inversely related to the level
of search costs. '1'he posted price outcome would then appropriately describe markets
witli relatively low search costs; negotiated pricing would predominate when search is
r:rlher rusl.ly~. In what. folluws, it. t.urns out that. Lhis conjeetum is not valid in general.
In~hrcl, Ihe cuiuparisou bcl,w~r~u jr,. ancl jrb is misleadiug siuce Lhcae prices refer to two
different cnvironments where al( the sellers employ the same exogenously given pricing
nrechanisrn. 'l'he endogenous determination of pricing rules will show that the individual
scller's gain from commitment depends on the other sellers' sales strategy. As a result,
commitment decisions generate a game between the sellers and strategic interaction ef-
fecls may upset the intuition derived from equations (3) and (5).
4 The Commitment Game
We uor~~ a~sinne t,hat cach individual seller can choose whether he wants to commit
liiinself tu a fixcd price or not. "I'his decision is not conveyed Lo thc buycr before he
sclects a seller. The buyer learns only after entering a store whether he can bargain or
whc~l.her Lh~. pric~r is already fixed by the seller. How can the seller commit to a posted
li~ed pricc~.' ' I'hc assumption of imperfect price information rules out that a concern for
long-run rc,putation effects may induce the seller not to negotiate prices. An alternative
commit~nont de~vice employs Lhe aid of a third party, as suggested by Schelling ( 1956).
"I'hc, ,cll~,r may siniply hirc a sales clerk who is contractually obliged to sell the good aL
a prespecified price without making any concessions to the customers. After realizing
lhat the agent. is not authorized to negotiate price reductions, the buyer has to accept
the price posted by the seller. We assume that price commitment is costly for the seller;
hc has to pay the amount k 1 0 per sale to prevent haggling with the buyer. A possible
interpretation is that. contracting with third parties is costly; the sales agent has to be
p:~i~l a G~~. t~~ ti~.ll Ib~. I~~N~~I ,~n Ih~. Le.half of lhe stom ownc~r.
'I~~~ .In~l~' Ihr I;:~inv ( r~~iu t~n~iunin~il.in~~nl. w~" lirvl. inv~~tiliF,al~~ Lh~" in:~rk~~t wpiilihriuin
whc~u au cxol;onously l;ivru (rac'tion (l C q C 1 of t.hc sellers is cununitted to p~, as given
by ('?), whilc t.he~ rc~maining fraction ( 1 - y) sells the good at the price pb, as given by
(~). "1'hc buyer rationally anticipates the price he will have to pay and so
pe-4P~f(1-9)Pt. (6)
'1'hc, equilibri,nn outcome ( p~,py) now depends on the fraction of sellers who post a
fixed pricc. Solving ( 1), (2), (.1), and ( 6) yields
P~-(9) - min[r, c t 2s~(1 - 9)], (7)
ancl
pn(9) - min[0.5(r f c), c t s~Íl - 9)~. (g)
lioth pric~~s, p,:(rl) and l,n(y), are increasing in q as long a.ti s G 0.5( I- 4)(r - c). '1'he
liil;hc~r Iho fracliuu of xellcrs who commit to a price ex aute, the higher are the prices
thc~ buyi~r has tu pay. 'I'hiti is so becausc~ his outside opl.ion payo(f v is lowcred when he
t;
is more likcly to pay a relatively high price after yuitting. Price commitment generates
externalities: If some sellers preclude negotiated pricing, also the other sellers are better
off. ('onverscly, when some fraction of sellers does not precommit to a fixed price, this
c.xerts a negative externality on the profits of the committed sellers. The same argument
aho r,xplaina why p'(y) C ~,, and Pr,(q) ? Pe-
'I'ho gross br,nefit from committing to a fixed price equals p~(q) - pb(q). Accordingly,
tót' st'llor will pay the cost k if p~(y) - pb(q) ~ k. Commitment is not profitable if
P~Íq) - Pd(q) C k. Interestingly, p~(q) - ps(q) is increasing in q. The incentive to preclude
hargainint; hcrumc~. st.ruugc,r whr,n a larger fraction of the sellers is rommitted to fix their
pricr cx antc,. 'I'his fact Icads to a coordination problem for the sellers and the strategic
cuiuplc~rucul:rril~ u( pririug nrcchanisrus may gc,ncratc a nrultiplicity of equilibria.
N'r~ will assunrc Ihat. tlrt` commitment cost k is distributed across the population of
sc~lle~rs arcurding to Ihc~ cunmlative distribution function F(.). Thus F(k) denotes the
fract.ion uf sr~llc,rti whou, conrmit.ment cost does not exceed k. Thc only restriction we
irnpose on l.'(.) is that I-'(0) - 0. 'I'his rules out the possibility of costless price commit-
mcnt. Wc do not require any continuity assumption; there may be mass points in the
distribution or k may simply be discretely distributed.~ In particular, all the sellers may
have thr, samc cost k. The equilibrium determination of q is studied as a non-cooperative
game br~t.wc~c~n t.he sellers. F.ach single seller takes q as fixed when he decides on his
salr~s stratogy. In c~quilibriwn, q has then to be consistent with aggregate seller behavior.
Since commitment is profitable for all sellers with k G p~ -pà, this leads to the following
dcfinilion of rrtuilihriiun.
Definition: A conunilmrul equilibrium is a fraction q' of sellers such that q' -
!'(l~'(v') - i~~(q')).
Wo (irsl. iin~c~sl.igato t.hc r,xistcncr~ o( an cquilibrium q'.
g
Proposil.iou l: 1'hrrr rri..L. au rquilibriunr y'.
1'ruu~: Ilrtinr y~(y) t~'(p:(y) I'n('t)). W'~ will dr,rnunnl.ratr Lhal. ip(.) haN a 6xrvl poinl.
ll c q' c L 4Ve proceed by showing that rp(q) is non-decreasing in q. 13y (7) and (8) one
ge'ts P~(y) - Pè(y) - min[0.5(r - c), s~(1 - 9)]. As s ~ 0, P~(q) - Pé(q) is non-decreasing
in q. Since F(k) is non-decreasing in k, this implies that rp(q) is non-decreasing in q.
As 0 C F(k) C 1 for all k, y~(.) maps (0,1] into [0.1]. This together with monotonicity
of y, (.) guaranlc~c~s cxistence of a solntion q' - y~(q') by Tarski's fixed-point theorem.s
Q.E.D.
Sincc p' and py depend on the characteristics of the sellers and the buyers, also
the cquilibrium y' is a fimction of these parameters. In the remainder, we discuss the
properties of the equilibrium. In particular, we focus on the impact of the search cost s
on y'.
5 Equilibrium Pricing Rules
A.pr~rial ralr~t;ury uf rvtnililrriunr uccurs whcu xll tór~ sr,llrrs arlupl. t.hc satnc priciug
tnr,chaniatn. "I'hc paranictcr constcllations that Icad t.o such an equilihrinm may help us
to def.cnninc whcther one or the other pricing rule is more appropriate for the analysis
uf a Kiven scarch cnvirontnr~nt..
Proposition 2: "I'hcrr i.v arc rquilibrium such Naal y' - 0 iJ and only ij F(s) - 0 or
l~ (O.~i(r - c)) - 0. An cyuilibrium with q' - 1 ezists iJ and only iJ F(0.5(r - c)) - I.
Proof: '1'here is an equilibrium with q' - 0 if and only if 0- F(p~(0) - pb(0)).
Since p~(0) - pb(0) - min[0.5(r - c), s] and F(.) is non-decreasing, this is equivalent
to min[!~'(.~). f~'(0.5(r - c))] - 0.
'('herc is au oquilibrium with q' - 1 if and only if 1- F(p~(1) - pb(1)). Since
P~(y)-Pn(y) - ~rtin[0.5(r-c), s~(1-q)], one has min[0.5(r-c), s~(1-q)] - 0.5(r-c) for q
su(ficiently largc. '1'herefore, the cyuilibrium condition is equivalent to F(0.5(r - c)) - 1.
lo
Q.E.D.
'I'hc lirst part of Proposition 2 implies that no seller wishes to deviate from negoti-
alocl priring whcn t hc huycrs' search cost is su(ficiently amall and Ihr, scllers' commitment
c~ust. aro hounclc,d away from zcro. More specifically, if s is smaller than the lowest k in
Lhc xnppurt uf l~'(.), thcrc is an equilibrium with q' - 0. Low search costs make precom-
mil.mcnt. on thc part of thc scllers less attractive. This may explain why in reality we
obse~rvc~ bargaining in markets where stores are located near to each other and switching
scllcrs is not very costly for the buyer as, for example, in oriental bazaars. The obser-
vation that low search costs can support bargaining as viable pricing rule is perhaps
surprising iu vicw of thc results of the previous Section. But, the intuition is that the
buycr's untsidi~ upt.iuu ri bccunicv morc valuablc whcn s is clccrcascd. 1'ricc courmitment
allows t hc scl Icr to appropriate the entire net surplus r- v- c while he gets only a share
uf Ihis surplu~ uudc,r bargaining. An incrcase in v reduces the difierence between the
two payoffs and thus thc gaiu from precommitment.
'I'hr liu~lint; t hat Nash bart;ainiug ~uay bc a sl.ablc pricing institnt.ion diffars frorn Pc-
tcrs (1991 ) who shows I hat the sellers have an incentive to adopt ex ante pricing when
priccs clscwhcrc are dctcrmincd by bargaining. This difference is related to a different
uotion of cx autc pricing. In Peters (1991) ez ante price offers are publicly observable
,o that a scllcr can affcct thc buyers' search behavior through advertising. He has an
iucentivc to propose an ex ante offer to increase the probability of being matched with a
bnycr. In cont.rast, in linc, wit.lt t.he traditional search modcl we assume that the buyer
only knows thcr distribution of prices but not the price or pricing rule chosen by a partic-
ular seller. 'l'hercfore, Ihe choice of pricing modes does not influence the buyer's search
strategy and cach seller is eyually likely to be matched with a buyer, independently of
whcthen c~ uses ex ante or ex post pricing.
It follows from Proposil.iou '2 that 0.5(r - c) is a critical value for the sellers' commit-
mcnl. co~l. I( A' ~ O.~i(r - c) for all the sellrrs, there exists an eyuilibrium with y' - 0.
ll
Uniform ex aute pricing constitutes an equilibrium when there is no positive mass of
sellers for whom k~ 0.5(r - c). Thus equilibrium trading behavior may depend on the
social surplus r- c. The higher this surplus, the more inclined are the sellers to prevent
price haggling. The empirical prediction is that bargaining is more likely to be observed
iu scarch niarkr~t.s for low quality goods, where r- c is relatively small. Indeed, casual
evidence~ suggests that negotiated pricing is a typical characteristic of second-hand or
(Ica-markcts. In contrast, in the market for high-quality brand goods clearly posted
t~rícr~s si,r,in lu hr Lhr rul~~.
Interestingly, the conditions for an equilibrium with q' - 0 and q' - 1 may be fulfilled
at the same time. For .~ G 0.5(r - c) this happens if the support of F(.) is contained
in Ih~~ intrr~~il [~,0.:~(r -- r)]. On~, migl~l. suspr,ct Lhat. mnll.iplr~ r~quilibria can arise only
in situations wl~ere k is conccntrated within this interval. The following example, how-
r~vr,r, donwutil.ratos tliat tnultiplicity may persist even with disperw~d distributions of k.
Alsu, Lhr~ r~xaniph, rcveals that such distributions may result in interior equilibria with
ll G y' C I.
Erurnplc: Supposc that k is uniformly distributed on [0,1] so that F(k) - k for 0 G k G
l. Let c- 0 and 0 G r c 2. The equilibrium condition then becomes
y' - min[0.5r, s~(1 -q')].
'I'hiti i~qnal.iun ha, a uni~tur- solution y~ i( s G['?r - r2]~A, whcre
(9)
4i -0.5- Q'l5-s. (10)
Nulin~ Ihal. yi I~~ndh to z~-ru as .v approaches zoro. If (`lr - r~]~4 G.9 G 1~4, there arc
twu addilioual tiulution~, y1 and y3, with
y2 - 0.5 f 0.25 - s and q3 - 0.5r. (11)
12
For s~ l~4 t.he unique equilibrium is given by q3. In this example the number of equi-
libria varies with s: The equilibrium is unique for low and high values of s; there are
thme equilibria ~~'hen .q lies in some intermediate range.
111ult.iple ~,qnilihria arise due to a ccxirdination problem faced by the sellers. The in-
dividual se~ller has a weak incentive to prevent haggling about price as long as a large
fracl.ion uf t.be ut.her sellers rely on ex post pricing. Conversely, he is less inclined to
Lat't;ain wil.h 6i. custun~crn in a ~uarkoL whcrr pusted pricing predoiuinatcs. As iu otlier
gainrs wit.h strategic completnentarities, the different equilibria can be ranked according
to the playcrs' welfare. All the sellers unanimously prefer a higher q' to a lower q'. But,
non-ccxiperat.ive int.eracLions may cxhibit coordination failure so that the sellers may
be stuck in an inferior equilibrium. The possibility of multiple equilibria indicates that
rational choice does noL unambiguously predict the formation oí pricing rules. After all,
historical and cultural factors may play an important role in the evolution and selection
of cyuilibrium trading bchavior.
lutrn~slint;ly, an inLc,riur cquilibrium 0 G y' G 1 involves price disporsion cven though
all t.he seller. offor thc same homogeneous good. With probability q' the buyer ends
np at, a ston~ wóerc he han Lo paY P~(9'): with probability 1- q' he has to spend only
p~,(y') aflcr liaggling with Lhe~ seller. Of course, the source of this price dispersion are
dilfcrences in thc cost R:. As in other search models with identical buyers, there must be
..uiuc hclcrut;~~nrit~' :~~nun~; ~cllen La Fenerate a dist.ribution of pricos.
'I'he alKw~, cs:~mplr alw rovoals t.liat genoral romparat.ive~ sLal.ics results cannot bc
obl.ained. Ind~Y~d, it n~ay happen that an increase in s lowers tbe value of y' iu one
cquilibriunt wltile q' is incrcased in another cquilibrium. Nonetheless, the following
I'rohosition sliows that one propcrty of the example can be generalized: When s be-
conu~s sntall, Lherc always is an eyuilibrium q' such that q' -~ 0 as s--~ 0.
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Proposition 3: I''ru~ ~ny 0 G q G I thrrr rrr..fx nn .y ~ 0 .rttch Jnr all ,v G s the
c'nmrnilnrrnl ganrr ha.. thr JnUou~ing properties: There ia al leasl onr rquilibrium q' wilh
y' ~ q. 11r~rr,~re r, iJ 1''(ll.a(r - r)) G I, lhrtr ie tto rqLlltbfYtt111 surle Ihal y' ~ q.
Proof: ('onsider ~(.) as dcfined in the proof of Propoaition 1. Note that, as a distri-
hution function, F(.) is right-hand continuous. This together with F(0) - 0 implies
lim,-u~(r~) - 0 for all 0 G q G 1. Therefore there exists an s) 0 such that cp(q) G q
whcncvcr s G s. Since y~(.) is non-decreasing, this implies ~p(q) G q for all 0 G q G q
and .c G... Accordingly, for s C s, ~(.) maps [O,q] into [O,q] and by Tarski's fixed point
tbeYirenr there cxists a y' C it such that q' - y~(q').
'l'o provc the second part of the Proposition, note that F(0.5(r - c)) G 1 implies
linr,-~ y( I''(ll.(i(r-c))) - 0. 'l'hcrefore., s 1 0 can be chosen such thaL yo(h'(0.5(r-c))) C 9
for all .~ G s. Now suppose there is an equilibrium q' ~ q even though s G s. Then it
n~u,t bc thc casc that.
~:(q~) - 4~ ~ 4~ y~(F(0.5(r - c))). (12)
r1. y~(.) is uun clcc.rrasing, Ihin in~lrlics q' ~ I'(O.~i(r - c)). Rut., liy dcfinit,ion of ~p(.)
unc has y(q) C h'(ll..i(r - r)) for all 0 G q C l. 'I'hcrcfore, F(0.5(r - c)) ? y~(4') - 9', a
contradiction. Q.E.D.
"f he cndogcnous detcrmination o[ pricing institutions provides a way out of Diamond's
( I ~)71) monopoly pricc paradox. For sufficiently small search costs, there is at least one
cyuilibriuni whcrc only a minority of sellers commits to a fixed price. Most of the trade
is conducted via bargaining and in the limit v-r 0 all prices approach the competitive
prirc p- r. lu fact,, any cquilibricnn must havc this feature whenever there is an arbitrary
,rnall fract.iou of scllcrs for whom commitment is prohibitively costly in the sense that
k ~ O.~i(r - c).
lic~stcr (I!)!)a) shows that in a ma.rket whcm buyers are imperfectly informed about
Lbc eluality of gtxrds, ncgotiated pricing tends to be replaced by posted pricing when
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search costs becotne uegligible. This result is obtained because the sellers can compete
as Bertrand competitors by posting ex ante offera. Advertising price information enables
tt~e seller to guarantee his customers a price before they visit his store. In the present
model the sellers are unable to communicate price information and so we obtain the
oppositc result: When switching sellers is not very costly for the buyer, negotiated
pricing will be the dominant form of trade because the sellers' profit ftom committing
lo a fixed pricc, i~ rat.her low.
6 Conclusion
Wo havo developed a simplc framework to study the formation oí pricing behavior in
scarch niarket.s. lu our modcl, all sellers have the same production cost and all buyers
am ideutical. 'I'his assurnption enabled us to derive rather simple pricing formulas for
1.hc two alLcrnat ive trading rules. There are no costs to bargaining because both parties
immediatcly come to an agrecment. With heterogeneous buyers this might no longer be
the case when the seller is uninformed about the characteristics of his opponent. Im-
perfect, infonnation bargaining typically generates time costs of haggling and the final
agreement will depend on the buyer's actual valuation and search cost. Negotiated pric-
ing thus allows the seller to discriminate between different types of buyers. The cost of
bargaining will then determine whether this makes negotiated pricing more attractive
for thc soller.
In thc equilibrium of our model, each cousumer visits exactly one store. 'I'here is
uu repeated soarch. Agaiu, t.liis is duc to t.hc assumption of idcntical buycrs. lf scarch
cosL di(fer, it rnay happen that only high-cost searchers buy the good from a seller who
has committed himself to a fixed price. For a buyer with low search costs it may be
advautageous to continue searching until he finds a store where the price is negotiable.
In such an euviromnent, equilibrium pricing rules might depend upon the distribution
of search cost.s xcross consumers.
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I~'u(,I,ii(,L~~~a
I.('ratt G,r~l ( I!lti?) analyses the incentives for commitment in a bilateral
inunupuly (ramewurk.
2. 'I'he nut.iun of 'strategic complementarity' has been introduced by f3ulow,
Gcauakoplos, and Klemperer (1985) to describe games where the players best-
response (unctions are increasing. For a general analysis of the properties oi
such gantes, see Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
3. A experimental comparison of bargaining behavior in different countries is
givcn in Roth et al. (1991).
.I. Of course, !'(.) has to satisfy the usual properties of a distribution func-
tiun, i.e. h'(.) has to be nondecre.asing and continuous from the right with
F(-oc) - 0 and F(oo) - 1.
5. A statement and some economic applications of Tarski's fixed point theorem
can be found in Milgrom and Roberts (1990).
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